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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This CMI Working Paper presents an analysis of civilian-military relations 
in Turkey, casting light on institutional, legal and economic aspects that 
have shaped the military’s role in society. An assessment of contemporary 
civilian-military relations in Turkey needs to be informed by a historical 
background. To that end, this paper chronicles how the military has evolved 
since the Ottoman Empire up till today, emphasising key historical processes 
that influence the dynamics between military and civilian powers. The 
paper concludes by observing that in recent decades the Turkish military 
has, by and large, withdrawn from the political scene, yet that recent 
political developments in the region and a corresponding intensification 
of security concerns leave open how this may evolve. Civilian-military 
relations have been considered in the context of the failed coup attempt 
of July 2015 in which the government aimed at absolute control over the 
armed forces and the military lost all of its major privileges. 
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INTRODUCTION
Turkish armed forces differ in many ways from those of South American, Middle Eastern 
and Southeast Asian states, where it has not been unusual for soldiers to attain an executive 
or a bureaucratic post (Sakallioglu 1997: 153). On the contrary, the Turkish military has not 
endeavoured to take control of the executive and legislative domains. That is, soldiers have 
remained soldiers, and when they have intervened into politics they have done so while 
maintaining their organizational identity. In so doing, the military has not violated the 
divide between political and military domains. 
What separates the Turkish military from its counterparts is its recognition of democratic 
politics and civilian rule; however, this recognition might have been shaped in the military’s 
own terms (Sakallioglu 1997: 153). The military has not aimed to dismantle democratic 
politics (that is, the electoral system), even though it has intervened in politics on several 
occasions with an objective of “fine tuning” (the military’s own wording). The failed coup 
attempt in July 2015 differs from other military interventions as it was organised by a 
clandestine group, Gulenists, which has infiltrated the state and the army over the last four 
decades. 
To Harris, the popularity and the power of the Turkish military can be found in the 
way it is perceived by society, which is “impartial, nonpartisan, trustworthy, element of the 
state, and one dedicated to protect citizens” (Harris 2011: 203). Although in the past large 
sections of Turkish society tolerated military intervention in politics, such intervention 
does not now garner popular support. The ways in which society conceives of the politics 
and of the military as an institution influences the activities and political presence of the 
military. This is particularly true in the Turkish case: the military is the still the most 
trusted institution in spite of the recent prestige-damaging verdicts that have led to the 
imprisonment of large numbers of military personnel (see also Sarigil 2009). Furthermore, 
one of the major standpoints that reinforces the embodiment of the military in society may 
be that militarization has been one of the constituent aspects of the Turkish identity. For 
example, completion of military service for males (now 12 months for 20-year-old males) 
is a symbolic event for becoming a “true male”. School history books are based simply on 
military achievements and narratives of how all of the world powers have engaged and 
still engage in dividing and ruling Turkey (Altinay 2004, 2009, and 2003; Altinay and 
Bora 2001). 
The military influence on politics has been above-politics, beyond attachment to any 
political party or political ideology, or economic and cultural cleavages (Sakallioglu 1997: 
154). Rather, the military has legitimized its position in politics as a guardian of the state 
and its unity, as well of the regime that is grounded on Kemalist ideology and secularism.
This guardian role can be defined as the long-term capacity of the military to define and 
redefine the ideology of the regime; identify its corporate existence with it; submerge itself 
beneath the surface and yet be able to support long-term political order; and to define and 
redefine threats to the regime and formulate responses more substantially than in liberal 
democracies. This role-belief does not just pervade the military’s mind but creates and 
sustains a particular culture where the military is not just a professional organisation 
dealing with defense issues but a core element of the political system. The regime is in 
civilian hands but the custodial role of the military allows it a free entry into policy-making. 
(Cizre 2007: 5).
Geopolitcs is a key factor that affects the guardian role of the military (Cizre 2007: 8). 
Turkey’s geography reinforces this role and facilitates a security discourse to dominate 
politics. For example, it has been often said that the country is situated “directly in 
the middle of a region full of risks and challenges such as ultra-nationalism, religious 
fundamentalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and ethnic 
conflicts which emerged following the Cold War period and intensified in the Balkans, the 
Caucasus and the Middle East” (Cizre 2007: 8). Despite these challenges, as is claimed by 
some politicians and experts from Turkey and the world alike, the country has an important 
“geo-strategic position”; it is “a bridge” and a “gate opening to Eurasia.” The military, 
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therefore, has perceived for itself a responsibility to respond both to the new security 
challenges that have emerged post-Cold War and to the alleged strategic requirements 
of Turkey’s geopolitical position. Furthermore, during this period, the military has been 
working to respond to major domestic security issues deriving from the Kurdish insurgency 
and the rise of political Islam. 
This report benefits primarily from secondary literature, but also draws upon the 
information that is being made publicly available in the policy reports prepared by 
independent research institutions based in Turkey and elsewhere. The media in particular 
provides an overview about the latest developments in Turkey regarding the imprisonment 
of several high-ranking officers and many others following their attempts to topple the 
government. 
Section 1 provides an overview of the role of the military in Turkish society and politics 
with a particular focus on the relations between military and civilian actors in Turkey. The 
Annex in this CMI Working Paper explains the military’s internal structure and its self-
perception, and summarizes the military’s involvement and interest in the economy. The 
final section offers some concluding remarks.
Photo: Nabi Yücel. CC license.
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1. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A historical overview of civilian-military relations in Turkey should start with the Ottoman 
period. Extending the historical background to the pre-republican period reveals the origins 
of the central role that the military has played in contemporary Turkish politics and society 
from the structure of the Ottoman state/society relationship. Ottoman society was divided 
into two components: the rulers (askeri) and the ruled (reaya). The rulers constituted the 
central administration of the Ottoman Empire, and, in the period of the Empire, consisted 
of the military, the court officials, and the religious clergy (Heper 2011: 175). The ruled, on 
the other hand, consisted of the tax-paying class (including the non-Muslim population) and 
slaves. In the Turkish language the connotation of askeri is of the military, or of any given 
entity or issue that is in one way or another related to the armed forces. Modernization in 
Ottoman society began initially in the army, and the members of the armed forces were 
the first and only that engaged in Western education until the end of the late nineteenth 
century. The military played a crucial role in the political reforms conducted during the 
nineteenth century that were intended to westernize the Ottoman political structure, and 
in the constitution of the Republic in the aftermath of an independent war (Eisenstadt 
1987: 135–153; Zurcher 2004). 
In the 19th century the military was “not only the object of change but also the subject of 
change” (Heper 2011: 175; see for a detailed analysis and overview Berkes 1964; Lewis 2002; 
Ahmad 2002). Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) forcedly disbanded the Janissary corps. 
Instead, he created a “European-style army”, Asakir-i Mansure’i Muhammediye (the victorious 
troops of Muhammad). After the formation of a Military Council (Dar-i Sura-yi Askeri), 
“the Ottoman state came into possession of a single military organization under unified 
command” (Hanioglu 2011: 177). Abolishment of Janissaries in 1826 had an impact on the 
Ottoman reforms. Although some perceived of it as an “auspicious event”, “constitutional 
opposition between 1868 and 1908 regarded the event as an incremental step on the path 
towards bureaucratic dictatorship” (Hanioglu 2001: 178).
The influence of the army was expanded under the Hamidian regime, although there 
remained a clear separation between the civilian and military spheres (Hanioglu 2011: 180; 
see also Zurcher 2004 and Ahmad 2002). For example, commanders of the armed forces 
and the navy could become cabinet members, thereby involved in the decision-making 
process regarding non-military matters (Hanioglu 2011: 180). It had also become common 
practice to appoint generals to distant provinces with a dual role of both governor and 
commander. Whereas some members of the military had important duties in government, 
Hanioglu (2011: 180) notes that the opinions of the military had been considered as of equal 
importance relative to the opinions of the civilian institutions. However, civilians remained 
in charge of making final decisions.
The military’s self-image of its role in society was transformed by the military reform 
launched by German military theorist Colmar von der Goltz (Hanioglu 2011: 180). Although 
his mission was to structure the Military Academy, Goltz also “attempted to instil a new 
ethics of service and discipline”, and “enhanced role for the military in society” (Hanioglu 
2011: 181). His ideas, inscribed in his treatise Das Volk in Waffen (The Nation in Arms), 
prescribed the military a superior class position—noblesse oblige—thus stating that it should 
not simply be subordinate to the state. Goltz was convinced that his ideas were pertinent to 
Ottoman society, as the society was calling for the guidance of a new elite class, that of the 
military. Hanioglu (2011: 181) notes that the Turkish translation of Goltz’s book was widely 
read in the military academy from 1886 onwards, and “the entire senior Ottoman officer 
corps had come around to the opinion that it was their duty to transform the empire into 
a nation in arms”. To achieve this under the Hamidian regime was not plausible though, 
since the military’s role was confined to providing advice. The military, however, was keen 
to extend its power. 
The military gained strength after the 1908 revolution, with its role defined as a power 
broker together with the parliament and the press (Hanioglu 2011: 178). The 1908 Young 
Turk revolution had implications for civilian-military relations. Hanioglu (2011) suggests 
that the para-military Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) controlled the army after the 
revolution, even though the military had initially aimed to play a power-broker role. Formed 
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initially as an intellectual organization, CUP was later transformed into a para-military 
organization after 1907. It did not, however, aim to dismantle the state, but to save it. 
Therefore, its ideology was state-centered (Hanioglu 2011: 178). The CUP’s political agenda 
was to exert pressure on the sultan to execute the Ottoman constitution of 1876. The CUP 
controlled the lower ranks and the para-military groups at the time of the 1908 revolution; 
however, higher ranking officers were willing to take the revolution in a different direction. 
Unschooled officers preserved their loyalty to the sultan. The CUP aimed to take control over 
the higher officers as well, while transforming into a legal-political organization (Hanioglu 
2011: 182). In the beginning of the 20th century the military defended the constitutional 
monarchy; during the CUP period (1912–1918), it was engaged in daily politics. However, 
the military could not become a professional body (Heper 2011: 175). The National Union 
Committee conducted the 1960 coup, yet lost power afterwards at the expense of their 
chain of command. The CUP leaders created their own army in which they were the high 
command (Hanioglu 2011: 193). 
Phase I: The Republican period 1923–1960
The Republican period took the role of the military in a different direction by prescribing 
a “guardianship” task to the military in order to guard the secular and modernist reforms 
of the republic. During this period military officers were strictly banned from engaging in 
politics. The civilian-military relationship has become more intricate from 1950s onwards, 
since Turkey began its parliamentary democracy experience and regular multi-party 
elections. 
Following Hale (2011), the military’s role in Turkish politics from the 1920s to the end 
of 1950s can be categorized in three periods. During the first period (1923–1926), Ataturk 
managed to isolate the possible challenges to his personal power that could be posed by the 
military officers, thereby constructing his personal power in the emerging regime. This was 
followed by a period (1926–1950) of securing the allegiance of the army to the new regime 
and its essential ideological premises for the inaugurated nation-building project with the 
Republic. The multiparty period, starting with the electoral victory of the Democrat Party 
(DP) and lasting until end of 1950s with the three successive electoral achievements of that 
party, constitutes the third period.
In the first period, the Republican establishment aimed to prevent the military’s 
involvement in politics, which might be realized by, for instance, military officers’ direct 
intervention in day-to-day politics, their ability to become parliamentary members, or their 
assignment to political roles. Rather, the Republican establishment assigned the military 
the role of guardian of the Republican reforms, the most vital being secularism and civic 
nationalism. After 1923 two senior commanders remained in the parliament (Ismet Inonu 
and Fevzi Cakmak); the former served as the prime minister and the latter as general-in-
chief during Ataturk’s rule. (Hale 2011: 193). Fevzi Cakmak was the chief of the General 
Staff from 1921 to 1944. He was unique in the history of the Turkish army not only for his 
long-lasting posting, but as the only person given the title of Marshal. According to Hale 
(2011: 195), the presence of Cakmak was one of the key factors in keeping the military loyal to 
Ataturk. Some senior commanders formed the opposition group: Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuat 
Cebesoy, Cafer Tayyar Egilmez and Refet Bele. Given that these generals were recognized 
in the country, according to Hale (2011), they could have been a threat to Ataturk’s newly 
emerged power. 
During the second period, one of the main tools used to curb military influence and 
thereby keep the armed forces outside of parliamentary politics was the legal amendment. 
Law No. 385, enacted in December 1923, suggested that “in future elections officers and 
Photo: Flickr user 
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soldiers would be obliged to resign from the forces before their election as deputies could be 
validated” (Hale 2011: 193). As established in the 1924 constitution as Article 23: “a person 
is not permitted to be Deputy and hold another Government post at the same time” (Hale 
2011: 193). Article 40 of the 1924 constitution prescribed the General National Assembly the 
role of supreme commander of the army, to be “represented by the President of the Republic” 
(Hale 2011: 193). Moreover, the chief of general staff lost his seat in the cabinet when the 
institution of caliphate was abolished in March 1924. As a consequence, the chief became 
responsible directly to the president instead of the ministry of defense. (Hale 2011: 193). 
The Military Penalty Code was enacted in 1930. Article 148 of that code stipulated that 
military staff who “assemble together for political objectives, join political parties, participate 
in political demonstrations, meetings, or elections, or in any manner whatsoever make oral 
suggestions with these objectives, or write political articles or make speeches to this effect, shall 
be prisoned for up to five years” (Hale 2011: 195, italics added by Hale).
The Armed Forces Internal Service Law was accepted in 1935. Article 35 of that law 
indicates that “the duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland 
and the Republic of Turkey, as determined in the Constitution” (Hale 2011: 195). This article 
provided legal grounds for the military to intervene in Turkish politics in order to protect 
Kemalist secularism. It was abolished in 2013.
With these legal provisions, the military played a significant role in the early years of the 
new regime in “education, social mobilization, and nation-building” (Hale 2011: 195). The 
military played a vital role in the modernization reform. Military schools enabled social 
mobility by providing state-sponsored education, which would guarantee a permanent job 
with high status. Military academy provided a modernist and a secular curriculum. The 
notes of a traveller from the 1930s, quoted in Hale, describe the influence of the military 
service on a Turkish citizen: 
There was no need for him to learn to use a rifle because he had grown up with one. But 
the army had taught him other things—discipline, cleanliness, a sense of time, improved 
methods for cultivating the land, reading and writing and—perhaps the most important 
of all—a feeling of responsibility for his fellow-men. He had been in his village for the 
past seven months and obviously not forgotten what he had learnt. (Linke 1938:122–3 in 
Hale 2011: 195)
For a number of reasons, some groups took opposing positions within the army. One 
position was to modernize and professionalize the army. Between 1923 and 1945, the 
military could not become a professional institution. NATO made a vital impact on the 
modernization and professionalization of the Turkish army. Under the terms of the 
Marshall Aid program in 1948, the US government transferred modern military materials 
and sent specialists to train the Turkish armed forces to use them. Although young officers 
were more open to the new technological innovation, they thought that the conservative 
hierarchical structure in the armed forces precluded reform. Another reason for the spread 
of dissatisfaction among some in the army was economic. During the 1950s, the salaries of 
the military personnel were not sufficient. This was combined with then Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes’s unfriendly attitude towards the armed forces and the growing perception 
in the military that the DP government was violating Kemalist secular principles. Menderes 
did not make improvements in the salaries of the armed forces. The DP government 
became authoritarian. One of the justifications of the 1960 coup was that the DP would 
seek to abolish the elections and establish a single-party regime (Harris 2011: 203). 
During the third period, which commenced with the establishment of a multi-party 
period, the military’s political roles changed. When the Democrat Party was founded in 
1946, young officers supported that party instead of the Republic People’s Party. The 1960 
coup was organized by the middle ranks of the officer corps. Hale (2011) claims that to 
argue that the army unconditionally supported the Republican Peoples Party, CHP, during 
the single-party period is misleading. Although the formula “CHP + army = power” (CHP 
+ army = iktidar) was very popular, some members of the armed forces was keen to end 
the mono-party regime, thereby aligning with the Democrat Party when it was founded 
in 1945 (Hale 2011: 197).
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Professionalism of the military continued, and, during the 1950s, the military started 
to disengage from its politically neutral position and to involve itself in Turkey’s political 
life by claiming to guard secularism and civic nationalism (Heper 2011: 175). Military 
officers were educated in terms of Western norms and values and were sincere supporters 
of westernization.
Huntington (1957) argued that professionalism (military education and modernization 
of the armed forces) would keep the generals away from politics and that they would focus 
on defense policies. However, as Stepan (1973) contended, this was not always the case. In 
contrast, the influence of the military in politics grew during the Cold War in some Latin 
American and Middle Eastern countries as well as in Turkey despite professionalization 
of the army (Sakallioglu 1997: 152). Professionalism could increase the political influence 
of the military because it brought about a corporate independence for the military; as a 
result the armed forces could maintain discretion to decide those issues relating to its 
organisational activities including promotions, appointments, discipline, education, reform 
and modernization. 
Nevertheless, professionalization falls short in explaining the power of the Turkish 
military. In order to grasp the peculiarities of the Turkish case, one still needs to consider 
the “historical-cultural context”, as only this context can explain how the Turkish military 
could possess a kind of political autonomy allowing intervention and control in Turkish 
politics. 
Phase II: The era of regular military interventions (1960–1980)
The 1960 coup resulted in the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of 
his cabinet members, but, as is often pointed out by intellectuals, it brought about a liberal 
constitution. However, the constitution of 1961 also established the National Security 
Council (NSC, a forum where the military and civilians regularly discussed security issues) 
and paved the way for the institutionalization of the military’s political influence in Turkish 
political history. Hale argues that when the armed forces took power they contradicted the 
Ataturk’s legacy of not intervening in politics, even for the sake of protecting the Kemalist 
principles (Hale 2011).
In addition to the NSC, the 1960 constitution brought the following: a senate in addition 
to the parliament and an electoral system of proportional representation. In the NSC, the 
politicians had to comply with the views of the military on security-related issues. Security, 
however, entailed both domestic and external security, thereby leaving a great deal of room 
for intervention: “The generals, however, had made constitutional changes not only to 
dilute the power of the civilian government, but also to allow the commanders to maintain 
an influential role in political life” (Harris 2011: 205). One of the practices that became a 
tradition after the 1960s was to agree on a president from among the retired top brass of 
the army. (This was however changed after the 2000s. Ahmet Necdet Sezer was a jurist 
and a member of the constitutional court, and Abdullah Gul, the previous president, as 
well as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current president, both have careers in politics).
In the 1960s, some scholars, such as David Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, celebrated 
the military’s intervention in 1960, as they believed this act to be a positive move that 
secured Turkey’s modernization and enlightenment project (Hale 2011: 199). Such a view 
is now marginalized. There were other coup attempts after 1960, which were launched by 
Talat Aydemir and Fethi Gurcan. Aydemir and Gurcan were executed in 1964, after two 
failed coup attempts in 1962 and 1963. 1400 cadets were also expelled from the military 
academies on suspicion of their engagement in the failed 1963 coup (Jenkins 2005: 35).
During the 1960s, Turkey became a polarized country along ideological lines between 
right and left wing groups; clashes even led to casualties. During the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, a group of leftist intellectuals inspired by Dogan Avcioglu’s thoughts (mostly 
published in the journal Yön) tried to invoke the army to initiate a socialist revolution in 
order to establish a Baathist-like regime based on the principles of Kemalism, which they 
called the National Democratic Revolution (Milli Demokratik Devrim). 
The senior generals delivered an ultimatum to the government in March 1971. The 1971 
ultimatum was intended to become a constitutional amendment that would take measures 
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against the threats to national unity, public order, and national security; and consolidate the 
autonomy of the army (Harris 2011: 206). The memorandum of the army forced formation 
of a technocrat government to deal with the escalating tension, otherwise the military 
threatened to take power. The government (Justice Party) was dissolved, but the parliament 
was not abandoned. The parliament gave confidence to the technocratic government that 
ran the country from 1971 until 1973. During this period the military did not rule the 
country, but influenced politics by demanding that the government introduce martial law 
in some provinces where violence was intense. However, civilians had the discretion to take 
measures. In 1973 elections were held again (Harris 2011: 206). 
The notion of national security focused on securing national unity, which could be 
challenged along the lines of “class, sect, religion, race or language” (Harris 2011: 206). The 
left was also considered a threat. Some restrictions on unions were imposed. The autonomy 
of the universities was abolished. However, political polarization increased in the 1970s; 
stability and order were not achieved. Political Islam emerged with the establishment of 
the National Salvation Party led by Necmettin Erbakan in the early 1970s. The Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) emerged from these roots, with Recep Tayyip Erdogan and 
several politicians distancing themselves from the ‘national outlook’ view that dominated 
political Islam from 1970 to the late 1990s. The political situation during the 1970s grew 
increasingly unstable: unsuccessful coalition governments followed each other; society 
was divided along the ideological lines; and the parliament could not manage to choose 
its president after 102 successive attempts. Violence was widespread. Given the political 
stalemate, the un-governability of the state and society, and the rising violence, the military 
takeover of September 12, 1980, was justified by the Turkish society. 
Phase III. Civilian- military relations under the shadow of an 
authoritarian constitution (1980–2002)
This section provides a closer look at the history of Turkish politics as well as the external 
dynamics that have influenced civilian-military relations post-1980s. In addition to a 
focus on the “drivers”, there are other mechanisms that have shaped civilian-military 
relations, such as legal and constitutional provisions, as well as institutional safeguards 
that enable civilian control or vice-versa. For example, an important dimension of the 
military’s political role was its predominant role in shaping the “national security” concept. 
The content of that concept has been conceived so widely and vaguely that it could involve 
any issue, namely the perceived threat of political Islam, of Kurdish separatism, Turkey’s 
accession to the European Union, administration of the curriculum in the education 
system, administration of higher education, and the activities of the media. Other factors 
that facilitated military autonomy after the 1980s include: the National Security Council, 
the presidency, organization of defense, military budgets, military spending, security 
and intelligence, and senior promotion (Sakallioglu 1997).It is difficult to assess whether 
the hierarchy was functioning perfectly in the Turkish Armed Forces’s (TAF) internal 
structure before 1980. The 1960 coup was initiated by junior officers, and after the 1971 
memorandum three generals and eight colonels were dismissed on charges of hierarchy and 
command mechanism (Jenkins 2005: 37). The 1980 military takeover, however, followed 
the chain of command; it was carefully planned, thus differed from previous experience. 
Before the takeover, the then chief general of the staff Kenan Evren sent a letter to the 
president Fahri Korutruk to end the ongoing violence in the country. It has been claimed 
that from that time until the military takeover over 1900 people died in clashes (Jenkins 
2005: 38). After the 1980 military takeover, the military seized control of executive power. 
The chief of the general staff, Kenan Evren, was given the title of chief of state and head 
of the National Security Council, while the chief of navy, Bulent Ulusu, was appointed 
prime minister (Harris 2010: 209). One of the actions that the military junta took was 
to prohibit all kinds of political activity during the post-coup period, and the leaders of 
the political parties of the day were detained (Harris 2010: 209). They were considered 
responsible for the violence and clashes. In order to consolidate stability and peace the 
military junta initiated martial law. The military regime carried out executions mostly 
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of those coming from leftist circles. Political parties were abolished in the end, as the 
leader of the left (Ecevit) and right (Demirel) refused to cooperate with the objectives of 
the military. According to Harris, the generals did not plan to abolish political parties in 
the post-coup period, but to eradicate antagonism that stemmed from partisan politics 
(Harris 2011: 2010).
Above all, the key legacy of the junta that re-shaped the political and social life from 
1980s onwards is the authoritarian constitution written under the military’s control. It 
was ratified by the citizens (91.7 percent) on 7 November 1982. The new constitution 
restricted political liberties and freedom of expression considerably. As in the pre-1980 
period civilians could not manage to end the clashes and render the country governable by 
finding solutions to hyper-polarization under coalition governments. The new constitution, 
the so-called September 12 (the date it was ratified by the public in 1982), therefore, aimed 
to construct an effective political system that would not be obstructed by fragmentation 
in the parliament. The bicameral system was brought to end with the eradication of the 
Senate that had been created following the 1960 coup (Harris 2010: 209). Furthermore, 
a new election law brought a threshold of ten percent of national votes in order to prevent 
fragmentation in the political system and coalition governments by restricting the entry of 
minor parties to the parliament. The constitution also confirmed the presidency of Evren 
for the succeeding seven years. 
At the end of the junta period, the military tried to manipulate the elections by publicly 
declaring its choice, the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) run by a retired general. 
However, Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party (MP), positioned in the center-right, had a 
significant victory, receiving 45.2 percent of the vote while the NDP managed to receive 
only 23.3 percent placing it third after Erdal Inonu’s Social Democratic Party (SODEP). 
Although the junta had banned the active participation of the pre-1980 politicians who were 
accused of being responsible for the political stalemate and the bloodshed in the country, 
the return of those politicians to active political life was enabled in 1987 as the result of a 
referendum, in which a tiny number of majority “yes” votes declared their willingness to 
open the political space to the old names.
1982 CONST I T U T ION A ND L EGA L SA FEGUA R DS
With the new constitution, as was the case in the 1960 constitution and the 1971 
memorandum, the military achieved new powers before returning the political scene 
to civilians. The powers of the NSC were expanded in 1983; the responsibilities of the 
military were “not just for the defense of Turkey’s territory and its political and economic 
interests, but also for the preservation of its ‘Kemalist’ legacy” (Cizre 2007: 4). The military 
endeavoured to exert its political power and influence the politics of the NSC. The NSC 
justified intervention in the civilian sphere not only by defining the security issues, but also 
by having the authority to take precautions in the case of a perceived threat (Bayramoğlu, 
2002: 40). Bayramoğlu highlights the prominent role of the armed forces in Turkish 
political life by indicating that the other political institutions exist to serve to legitimize 
the military dominance in the decision-making process, whereas the role of civilians is to 
approve military policies. To him, when the armed forces are interested in an issue, that 
issue loses its political aspect and is redefined according to the national security concern 
(Bayramoğlu 2002: 40).The membership of the National Security Council was re-arranged 
as a regular institution, and the position of general secretary, responsible for coordinating 
and monitoring the decisions of the NSC, was established. The National Security Council 
Secretariat determines, formulates and implements policies related to national security 
(Cizre 2007: 4: see also Karaosmaonoğlu 2000). Until 2003, the council of ministers were 
legally required to give priority consideration to NSC decisions. The wording determining 
the way in which the decisions of the NSC were to be formulated by the cabinet was 
reformulated. Whereas in 1971 the law stipulated that the NSC “recommend its views to the 
Council of Ministers”, according to the amended version in 1982 “decisions of the Council 
[NSC]…are to be given priority consideration by the Council of Ministers” (Harris 2011: 
201). The military perceived the Kurdish insurgency and the growing political Islam as 
twin threats to national security (Jenkins 2005: 39). Another avenue by which the military 
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supported its power was the presidency. Six of the presidents in the Republican period were 
chosen from among the generals. With the new law, the president was entitled to represent 
“the office of the commander in chief”, to appoint the chief of general staff, and to declare 
martial law (Harris 2011: 210).
The position of Chief of the General Staff in defense policies is another standpoint 
through which the military establishes its power in politics. Each Chief has been responsible 
directly to the Prime Minister since 1961, though in advanced democracies the norms 
presuppose the Chief to be responsible rather to the Minister of Defense. As result, the 
Chief, in practice, replaces the role of Minister of Defense (Cizre 2007: 4), even though the 
latter is accountable to the Parliament in terms of defense policies. Therefore, the Chief is 
entitled to equal status with the Minister of National Defense. The Chief is also appointed 
by the President instead of the Council of Ministers. The Organization Law of the Ministry 
of National Defense (Law no. 1325) stipulates “the principles, priorities and programs to be 
determined by the Chief of General Staff: Recruitment of soldiers in times of peace and 
war; provision of weapons, tools and logistical requirements; war industry services; health 
services; construction, real estate, settlements and infrastructure services; and financial 
services including account enquiries” (Berksoy 2013: 112). Given these roles, the authority 
of the Minister of National Defense is restricted.
The presence of the military judiciary on the other hand causes a judicial duality, military 
courts in effect working in parallel to the judicial system. Military courts and military 
disciplinary courts were established by 1961. Given that no other institution is eligible for 
the privilege of having its own judicial mechanism, the military stands out as a peculiar 
case inasmuch as it enjoys that privilege (Berksoy 2013: 14). As a result, as Cizre suggests: 
“While extensively restricting individual rights and freedoms, the latest constitution of 
1982 entrenched the military’s veto power in the political system to such an extent that it 
has made crude military intervention into politics redundant” (Sakallioglu 1997: 153–4).
However, the power of the military was challenged occasionally by the governments of the 
day. For example, the military and the government had different views on a possible military 
intervention in Iraq in the early 1990s; it was the military that supported non-intervention. 
The military had refuted Ozal’s reluctance to participate in the US-led Operation Desert Storm 
against Saddam Hussain in late 1980s. Ozal was willing to penetrate Northern Iraq, thereby 
assisting the US military operations coordinated from Saudi Arabia (1990–1991). However, 
the not-so-secret internal motivation of Ozal was, in fact, to regain the two oil-rich provinces 
of Kirkuk and Mosul. Such a claim could engender enthusiasm in Turkish public discourse 
because these provinces were part of the National Oath of 1918 (Misak-i Milli). Torumtay 
resigned from his office on 6 December 1990 after his challenge to Ozal’s ambitions, even 
though he had been recommended for that post by Ozal against the military’s own candidate.
The 1982 constitution also paved the way for the reinvigoration of political Islam blended 
with a flavour of Turkishness by introducing the compulsory teaching of Islam in schools. 
It is widely accepted that this attempt has facilitated the growth of political Islam and the 
Turkish-Islam synthesis from 1980 onwards. The Welfare Party (WP) formed a coalition 
government in 1996 with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party (established and run by Suleyman 
Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party that was a crucial actor in Turkish political life). The 
military showed clear dissatisfaction with the idea of a political Islam-oriented government. 
The military forced the government to resign. It is known in Turkish politics as a post-
modern coup, because not only was the government warned to follow the principles of 
Kemalism and secular values, but also civil society was mobilized in organizing a campaign 
against the government by aligning several NGOs (such as the Support for Modern Life 
Association and the Contemporary Education Foundation [Cagdas Yasami Destekleme 
Dernegi], and the Atatürkist Thought Association [Atatuturkcu Dusunce Dernegi]).
In sum, the military was at the centre of politics in order to guard the unity and secular 
character of the state during the 1990s. Escalating clashes with the Kurdish group, PKK, 
and the challenge of the Islamic discourse in political and social life, led the military to 
try to influence politics and at times mobilized secular-minded segments of the society. I 
provide this historical sketch because in the early 2000s the nature of the civilian-military 
relations was radically transformed in favour of the civilians. 
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Phase IV: End of the military tutelage (2002–present)
At least two significant developments fostered such a radical transformation: the Turkish 
accession process to the European Union and the emergence of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) as a dominant political force. The EU and the AKP can be considered the key 
drivers that dramatically changed the nature of civilian-military relations. 
Clearly, a major external factor that influenced civilian-military relations, particularly 
after the 2000s, was the European Union. Turkey’s relationship with the EU dates back to 
the 1960s, when Turkey signed the Ankara agreement in 1963 establishing partnership 
with the then European Economic Community in order to integrate the country into the 
customs union, or trade partnership, and towards EU membership. The turning point that 
gave the EU-Turkey and civilian-military relations a different impetus, through the granting 
of candidate status to Turkey, took place at the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999. As such, 
Turkey started negotiations with the EU, which necessitated the adaptation of Turkey’s legal 
and political system to EU policies. Accordingly, civilian-military relations and the security 
sector writ at large have been under the scope of reform because the EU has required 
the democratic oversight of the former (Cizre 2007: 4).1 The EU acquis commuitaire has 
obliged Turkey to amend the 1982 constitution and the structure of the National Security 
Council, while further requiring changes to the judiciary duality between the civic and 
military courts. Interestingly, it is through these changes in the Turkish judicial system that 
military staff could be tried in civic court instead of by the military court in the Ergenekon 
and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) cases, which will be discussed below.
The armed forces’ dominant and autonomous position in Turkish politics has been 
under attack during the membership process of the EU. Accordingly, the power of the 
armed forces must be reduced in order to meet the so-called Copenhagen criteria for 
accession, which includes the “Democratic control of the armed forces (Decaf)”. Decaf was 
developed for the Central and East European (C&EE) countries which have been in the 
enlargement zone of NATO and the EU since 1993–1994. As the enlargement has turned 
into a security interest in Europe, Decaf has become a key factor in promoting stability 
and peace in former communist states (Cizre 2004:111). Umit Cizre strongly criticizes the 
policy of presenting Decaf to Turkey as a membership criterion, suggesting that it misses 
the target when applied as a model for Turkey. Cizre compares the militaries of C&EE states 
and Turkey to prove her thesis. To her, the militaries in the C&EE states are “smaller in size, 
weaker in terms of force levels, underdeveloped in corporate identity, low in political profile 
and non-interventionist with regard to domestic politics” (Cizre 2004: 112). However, as 
we have elaborated in this paper, TAF acts as a legally legitimate actor in political decision 
making, and develops its own corporate views about democracy, public life and national 
security autonomously vis-a-vis elected representatives.
It is also obvious to Cizre that the armed forces seem reluctant to give up the traditional 
role of guardianship in the membership process. In the Helsinki Summit in 1999, when 
Turkey’s candidacy to the EU was formally accepted, Turkey automatically adopted the 
provisions of Decaf, which enables the arraignment of military institutions in civil court 
and withdrawal of TAF from the political scene. After 1999 the Turkish government took 
initiative to change constitutional codes that justified the political involvement of the army 
and removed the administrative organ of the NSC (the NSC General Secretary). 
In the context of Turkey-EU relations, the EU regards Turkey as geopolitically significant 
in the promotion of stability and peace in Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and 
Caucasus given the transformation of security concerns that have entailed with transitions 
from communism to terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and secessionist movements after 
the Cold War. Turkey has not had any problem in adapting to the new security concerns 
and alignments inside NATO. However, Turkey has given priority in the integration process 
to its capabilities and assets to EU’s defense bloc, despite the fact that the EU would have 
preferred a democratic and wealthy Turkey in the region to serve as a catalyst for liberal 
democracies in the region (Cizre 2004: 116). The armed forces seemed reluctant to reconcile 
with the EU’s stated mission of a “democratic Turkey” because it justified its intervention 
in politics and violations of democratic norms, as “exceptional” and “corrective” for internal 
enemies. For instance, after the NSC meeting on 28 February 28 1997, the army legitimized 
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its intervention by declaring that the fight with Islamic activism was “a guarantee not only 
for the regime but at the same time of democracy, societal peace and the modern life style” 
(Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 314). On the other hand, TAF evaluated the Copenhagen criteria 
as democratic compromises that were too high a price for Turkey to pay while combating 
regressive movements, irtica, and separatist terror (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 315). 
The EU documents related to Turkey addressed four fundamental issues for reform: the 
position of the Chief of General Staff; the role of the NSC; the composition and jurisdiction 
of the State Security Courts; and emergency rule in the Southeast. The General Staff is 
now responsible directly to the president, even though he should be responsible to the 
minister of defense under the EU democratization criteria. Moreover, the EU questioned 
the involvement of the armed forces in northern Iraq in 1997, which were undertaken 
without governmental approval. 
The role of the NSC has broadened throughout the 1990s, and the domain of its policies 
has expanded to areas that were formally considered the responsibility of civilian authority. 
It is paradoxical that the NSC enlarged its role in politics and social life, in spite of the 
supranational pressure of institutional reform, and even though some reforms had already 
taken place (Cizre 2004: 124). The military judge in the State Security Court council was 
replaced with a civilian one just before the Öcalan’s trial in 1999, and the composition of 
the NSC was modified in October 2001 so that the civilian members would outnumber 
the high-command soldiers. The role of the NSC was limited to advisory as part of the 
constitutional amendments. 
Against this backdrop, Decaf has been understood and applied in a purely institutional 
way by the EU (Cizre 2004:119). Cizre thus interpreted Decaf as an inefficient policy tool 
of the EU, in that it has regarded the militaries as ideology-free and purely defensive 
institutions with no corporate spirit, no history, and no ideological or alliance capabilities 
to assist them in providing public support and political prerogatives. In doing so, Cizre 
suggests, Decaf does not capture the “real politics” in which militaries are embedded. 
Therefore, to her, the EU proposal to “align the constitutional role of the NSC as an advisory 
body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU member states” is borne out 
from the insufficient understanding of the cultural, political and ideological weight of the 
military in Turkish life (Cizre 2004:121).
A major step was taken in 2003 with the Democracy package launched in August 
2003 within the scope of the harmonization with EU legislation (Cizre 2007: 11). The 
package bridled the influence of the military considerably by reshaping the influence and 
the composition of the NSC, the institution through which the military has been acting 
as a “shadow cabinet”. The NSC has been redefined as an advisory body, stripped of its 
executive powers. The package also contained the following changes:
• Rearranged the composition of the NSC breaking the quantitative and qualitative 
dominance of the military and increasing the committee’s non-military members.
• Amended wording of the related article directing the Council of Ministers to “evaluate” 
instead of “give priority consideration to the decisions of the MGK”. 
• Abridged the manoeuvring space of the Secretary in terms of executive; according 
to the annulled practice the Secretary could request confidential or non-confidential 
information from the non-military institutions, including ministries, public institutions, 
private organisations and private legal persons, obliging each to submit such information 
when requested (Cizre 2007: 12).
• Decreased the budget of the NSC by 60 percent.
• Established bi-monthly, rather than monthly, NSC meetings.
• Changed appointment procedures so that civilians could serve as Secretary General. 
According to the old procedures the Secretary General could only be appointed from 
within the military. Furthermore, the “chief advisor to the NSC and heads of some 
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departments and the contracts of 20 of the 53 retired military members of the Secretariat 
were not renewed” (Berksoy 2013: 8).
• Closed four of eleven departments of the Secretary and relocated their staff to other 
public institutions. 
• Endorsed parliamentary inspection of the military budget.
• Made public activities of the NSC and ended the secret regulation of the General 
Secretariat of the MGK (Berksoy 2013: 8).
• Transferred the NSC Secretariat’s duties concerning to “co-ordinate and monitor” the 
decisions of the MGK to the deputy prime minister.
Furthermore, the presence of the military in some of the state institutions was ended. New 
laws cancelled military representation in some state institutions, namely those of the Council 
on Higher Education and Higher Board of Radio and Television. State Security Courts were 
also abolished (Cizre 2007: 12). Meanwhile, there were other substantive changes within the 
judiciary, primarily affecting the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve 
Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu, HSYK) and the Constitutional Court. Changes to the law have led to 
the prosecution of those who took part in the military interventions.2
As a consequence, the power of the military over civilians and in the political system 
has been widely diminished—if not utterly exhausted—thanks to the legal changes 
(Berksoy 2013: 7). Consequently, the end of the military tutelage regime has been widely 
accepted among the public. Some argue that the civilian supremacy has not yet been 
consolidated, for a number of reasons: First, autonomy of the military continues because 
the military judiciary operates in parallel with the civilian judiciary. Second, the military 
is not transparent and in some ways not accountable; it is exempt from monitoring by the 
parliament and other non-military institutions, particularly as regards control of the military 
budget, including spending on weapons and militaristic equipment. Third, the duties of the 
General Command of the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command create some issues 
in terms of civilian control. The Gendarmerie is responsible for the security of domestic 
areas outside of the urban areas; however, it is tied to TAF (Berksoy 2013: 11). Fourth, the 
village guard system, which has been used as means of security over the last years, also 
causes problems in terms of violence and human rights violations (Berksoy 2013: 11).
Nonetheless, the legal changes have had considerable inf luence of the nature of 
civilian-military relations; the major turning point in this regard was undoubtedly due to 
the persecution of the major military personnel—including former top brass—in large 
numbers by charging them either of attempting to topple the government by coup or with 
involvement in criminal networks in order to foment chaos that would lead to a coup. The 
process of the trials was one of the key political events (if not the most pressing) experienced 
after 2008. During this period, military personnel were detained in successive operations. 
The seriousness of the allegations and the extent of the detainments soon made obvious 
that the nature of the civilian-military relations was transforming. 
CR IME A ND PUNISHMEN T: SL EDGEH A MMER A ND ERGENEKON
AKP was able to secure broad public support from the beginning, so they could smoothly 
operationalize its challenge against military control. Many argue that civilian control was 
made possible with the imprisonment of several high ranking officers and the ex-General-
in-Chief because of their “terrorist” crimes of toppling the democratic government through 
coup attempts (Sledgehammer, Moonlight, Blondegirl) and their participation in a criminal 
network, the so-called Ergenekon. The verdicts of the courts and the conduct of the cases 
have not satisfied many, even those who had high hopes. As we will see, even PM Erdogan 
and the supporters of the government later changed their positions and came to criticize 
the ways in which these cases had been conducted.
CMI  WORKING PAPER 11 ,  DECEMBER 2016 A H I S TO R I C A L S U R V E Y 1 7
Certainly, the trials against the military have changed the nature of civilian-military 
relations drastically. Of those, Operation Sledgehammer (in Turkish, Balyoz Harekâtı) 
found 237 members of the Turkish armed forces, mostly from the higher ranks, guilty of 
planning a military coup against the AKP. The judiciary, including the Higher Court of 
Justice, found a group of soldiers, who were not satisfied with the AKP hold on political 
power, guilty of planning a detailed political intervention in 2003. Those plans only came 
to light in 2010 when a Turkish newspaper, Taraf, wrote of the attempt and then delivered 
documents of evidence in a suitcase to the state authorities. According to those documents, 
the designers of the coup aimed to create a chaotic atmosphere in the country by bombing 
two mosques in Istanbul and shooting down a Turkish aircraft over the Aegean Sea in 
order to accuse Greece of being responsible. The defendants, however, claimed that this 
was merely a regular scenario being discussed in a military seminar. 
Operations against the suspected soldiers were conducted in 2010 and 2011; in total 365 
people were accused of committing crimes, including the then Chiefs of the land forces, of 
the navy, and of the air forces. Following the court’s indictment of a great majority of the 
defendants, an extraordinary event in the history of Turkish politics took place on 29 July 
2011: the top echelons of the armed forces—including the chief of the armed forces (Isik 
Kosaner), and the heads of the land forces, the navy, and the air forces—submitted their 
resignations to the prime minister before the Supreme Military Council where promotions 
in the army were decided. Kosaner said: “It has become impossible for me to continue in 
this high office, because I am unable to fulfil my responsibility to protect the rights of my 
personnel as the chief of general staff.”3 In 2012 the court sentenced most of those indicted 
to up to 20 years of imprisonment; the higher court by and large ratified the decisions, 
deciding to release several of those imprisoned on lack of adequate evidence.
Another major trial that concerns the military was the so-called Ergenekon case. The 
Turkish judiciary has determined that Ergenekon—named for a Turkish myth about a 
location in the Altay Mountains—is a secret organization formed by Turkish secularists 
and ultra-nationalists along with individuals from the military and security forces. It is, 
according to the courts, a network of terrorists, possibly the manifestation of the “deep 
state”, and responsible for most of the political terror over the last 30 years in Turkey. Their 
crimes, including provoking chaos by murdering elites, politicians, judges, military staff, 
and religious leaders, have been intended to dismantle the present government. The case 
has been a major political event with more than 500 people prosecuted since 2008. In terms 
of its relevance for this report, the Ergenekon case has significant implications for the nature 
of civilian-military relations. First, the court came to a conclusion that the military (both 
serving and retired officers) was engaged in clandestine activities as part of a larger network 
that used or plotted violence in order to achieve political ambitions. Furthermore, one of 
the objectives, as the court has determined, was to prepare for a military coup. Second, 
the General-in-chief who served between 2008 between 2010, Ilker Basbug, was found 
guilty of being a member of the terrorist organization and sentenced to 20 years. Oddly, by 
referring to the statements of Ilker Basbug, Professor Metin Heper of Bilken University, a 
prominent scholar in Turkish politics, argued that, after 2000, the military had come to the 
conclusion that the era of political interventions was over by recognizing that civilians have 
the right to make mistakes (Heper 2011). Heper (2011: 175) argues that “from 2002 onwards 
[the military officers] questioned the very wisdom of making interventions in politics.” He 
supports his argument by drawing on the statements of the high ranking officers. However, 
the judicial charges against and verdicts of several higher ranking officers diametrically 
contradict Heper’s claim. That is, the courts were convinced that the military had planned 
to topple the AKP government either through military coups or by attempting to create a 
chaotic situation in the country by aligning with terrorists under the umbrella terrorist 
network of Ergenekon. After the decisions on the Ergenokon case had been declared, many 
were convinced that the ultimate civilian dominance over the military was now established 
and the military would stay in their barracks. 
The ways in which these cases were carried out and the decisions of the courts have 
not been satisfactory or convincing to all. Some intellectuals and the supporters of the 
incumbent government initially celebrated the case as a watershed event that ended the 
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military tutelage and thus opened a new era of normal democratic politics. The Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed to have been the prosecutor of that case when 
the interrogations were launched. However, others claimed that the cases drew on 
forged documents (especially in the case of Sledgehammer) and inadequate means (or 
legally problematic) of evidence collection (such as using anonymous informants and 
gathering information by phone tapping) (see Jenkins 2009). For example, in the case 
of Sledgehammer, the defendants argued that the digital evidence, a CD driver, which 
constituted the cornerstone of accusations, was created years after the supposed crimes 
had been committed. Although the defendants claimed that the Calibri font used in the 
digital documents had not yet been launched in 2003, the high court was convinced that the 
documents could well have been revised afterwards. There have been numerous examples in 
the Turkish media about similar cases; those interested in the respective trials can visit Dani 
Rodrik and Pinar Dogan’s blog (http://balyozdavasivegercekler.com/category/in-english) 
for Sledgehammer and Jenkin’s piece on Ergenekon (Jenkins 2009). 
As of September 2013 through January 2014, the judicial processes surrounding the 
Balyoz and Ergenekon cases were starting to be questioned by the government and its 
supporters as well when interrogations began into a corruption scandal involving the sons 
of two ministers of the day on 17 December 2013. The government responded strongly to 
these interrogations considering them to have been organized by a secret ‘civil junta’ or 
‘parallel state’ (namely the Gulen movement) positioned within the state but acting outside 
state bureaucracy. In arguing that the corruption scandal had been brought to the agenda 
to topple the government, the government declared a war against the Gulen movement. 
These developments accelerated the political tension from the last days of 2013 onwards 
without signs of abatement. The developments had an unexpected consequence, when a 
political consultant (Yalcin Akdogan) implied that Gulen movement had organized a similar 
plot against the military, thereby manipulating the Balyoz and Ergenokon cases. After this 
statement, both the military and the government took action to appeal to the judiciary to 
retry the cases. The Constitutional Court’s verdict on the violation of constitutional rights 
in these cases led to the release of all of the detainees. 
As a consequence, the Balyoz and Ergenokon cases, which had once drawn massive 
public attention, were closed. The question now is how recent events have influenced the 
military’s self-perception of its role in society and the regime (and the state), and how the 
security paradigm should be defined and executed in the post-tutelage period. Harris makes 
the point for both pessimism and optimism:
And to this day, Turkish politicians still appear to believe (witness the Ergenekon case) that 
the military could step in again, not only to deal with widespread disorder, but even for 
nebulous causes such as violations of Ataturk’s secular policies. This perception continues 
to influence political attitudes and behavior. Indeed, it may have played a role in the drive of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to join the European Union as a way to increase 
the guarantees against a military move. And this certainly was instrumental in delaying 
Abduall Gul’s election as president until this course seemed ratified by hastily called 
elections…the military left the political scene to civilians by their own initiatives after 
each intervention; military interventions were by and large due to escalating disorder and 
violence in the country, but not due to the ambitions of the generals. (Harris 2011: 212) 
CMI  WORKING PAPER 11 ,  DECEMBER 2016 A H I S TO R I C A L S U R V E Y 1 9
CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the 1950s onwards the military has not aspired to hold power and institute a military 
regime similar to those of the Latin American countries or of Greece during the 1970s. 
Rather, the Turkish military supported democracy and, in principle, accepted the supremacy 
of civilians. Because it perceived its self-image as the guardian of secularism and of the 
security of the country, the military kept an eye on the political process, which led to 
several military interventions and institutionalized military presence in the political life. 
The military directly intervened in politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and mobilized civil 
society in 1997 vis-à-vis the government of the day. One of the main means by which the 
military has influenced civilians since 1960 has been to issue official statements. Turkey’s 
honeymoon with democracy ended with military intervention in 1960, which resulted 
in a new constitution within which the political roles of the military were safeguarded 
legally. The seeds of the politicization of the military were found in the political events 
that caused the military intervention and in the 1960 constitution that legitimized further 
interventions. The military intervened in the political process in 1971, 1980, and 1997, 
and in each case managed to enhance its political role by leading civilians to amend laws 
regarding the military’s role in politics. 
Some commentators have attempted to make a connection between the military and 
the interests of the social classes that would putatively support military intervention by 
arguing that military interventions had indeed reinforced the social and economic interests 
of some groups (Savran 1986). However, Sakallioglu (1997: 154) convincingly demonstrates 
that those alignments were contextual and temporary, and over time the support given 
to military has declined. In the light of this trend, in the Turkish case, according to Narlı 
(2000) there is a fragile alliance, or as she calls it, an “imperfect concordance” among the 
military, political elites, and the citizenry. To her, civil/military relations in Turkey are a 
specific outcome of the cultural, social and institutional context that has originated from 
a stratified society and political culture (Narlı 2000: 119). 
Similar to the views of Sakallioglu (1997), which we have considered in the introduction, 
Narlı suggests a significant aspect in understanding civilian/military relations is the 
concordance between the military and citizenry in that common values and goals of the 
society were better served by the army after the establishment of professionalism from the 
1950s onwards (Narlı 2000: 120). As a case in point, Narlı argues that the activities of the 
military after 1997, such as the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Republic during which the 
military shared the public space in specific ceremonies with civilians, helped erode civil/
military boundaries (Narlı 2000: 212). In addition, the army engaged in social works in 
Southeastern Anatolia, such as constructing bridges and providing materials for the area 
school, in an attempt to remove barriers between the society and the army. TAF’s success in 
the UN and NATO peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Bosnia further improved its prestige.
Nevertheless, Narli’s examples might be considered little more than symbolic because, 
especially after 1980, the armed forces isolated itself from the rest of society by constructing 
residents, social activity centers, restaurants and summer camps intended only for the 
officers of the army. Given also the case of the OYAK, which we elaborate below, the army 
has become an exclusionary social class, which has created its own habitat. 
The composition of the officer corps is not elitist, as we will see below in the discussion 
of Jenkins’s research (2005). The military’s recruitment methods thus illustrate a form 
of consensus. This also explains TAF’s unchallenged and perpetuating domination in 
Turkish politics, which until recently was not merely derived from its role in guarding 
the Republic, but also from its promotion and reproduction of the military ideology and 
militaristic culture among the public (Cizre 2004:11; Altinay 2004, 2009, and 2003; Altinay 
and Bora 2001). Not only has a militaristic culture been predominant in the perception of 
masculinity, it has been diffused throughout civilian society through the education system, 
not least through the now-abandoned classes on national security. 
Decision-making in Turkey has always to some extent been under the influence of the 
armed forces’ participation in Turkish politics (Narlı, 2000; 118). Yet, during the 2000s 
this situation changed. After the 1980 coup, the impact of the military on civilian life 
shifted between partnership and influence. Some scholars define the post-coup era as the 
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September 12 regime, referring to a situation in which state constituted the center and 
society the periphery. Here, the state aimed to impose on society an authoritarian and 
conservative statist concept of politics (İnsel 2003: 293). The Turgut Özal government, 
which came to power in the post-coup era and served until 1989, tried to initiate dominance 
over TAF. Yet, success of export-led growth and neo-liberal economic strategies of the 
Motherland Party (MP) strengthened the civilian sphere; this in turn challenged military 
supremacy in the state. For instance, Özal had the courage to recommend changes to the 
1982 constitution and, as we have seen, refused to appoint TAF’s nominee for the chief of 
the Turkish general staff; instead, he took the initiative by appointing his own candidate in 
1991. Necip Torumtay, though supported by Özal, later criticized Özal’s Gulf War policies 
and subsequently resigned from office.
The True Path Party (TPP)/Social Democratic People’s Party (SPP) coalition government, 
which was the successor to the MP, changed the nature of civilian-military relations and 
allied with the military. In the mid-1990s two significant factors, growth of political Islam 
and of Kurdish separatism, enhanced the dominant role and further justified the positioning 
of TAF in politics. An accelerated influence of the military in politics was a reaction to 
those issues. In the Welfare Party and TPP coalition government civil-military relations 
became tense because of the policies and attitudes of the Welfare Party. The majority of 
the population, including trade unions and NGOs, backed the campaign organized by the 
military and actively protested the anti-secular activities of the Welfare Party and of Islamist 
groups. Hence, in 1997, on February 28th, with great support from different segments 
of society—excluding some leftist, liberals and of course Islamists—NSC declared their 
decision to restore secularism in the state, education, and social life. This declaration was 
the end of the Welfare Party and TPP government. The measures taken by NSC, in the 
historic meeting, framed the mentality of TAF that would be imposed on politics. The 
“February 28th process” sought to efface any Islamic influence in politics, and to clear the 
public sphere from any Islamic image (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 310). In fact, TAF emphasized 
that the February 28th process was an ongoing one—army members who signed the NSC 
document were tried recently, but the court did not find criminal activity. 
The translation of national security concerns into public policy has changed the meaning 
of democracy in that rights and liberties have been subordinated to the demands of security 
(Cizre and Çınar 2003: 321). With the success of the Welfare Party in 1994 local elections, 
TAF engaged in making and breaking governments, issued public demands and warnings 
to civilians, structured new bills through its own research units and departments, organized 
campaigns to mobilize the society for the danger of political Islam, gave the final decisions 
to hold elections in 1999, and influenced foreign policy (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 321). The 
traditional image of above-party politics (Jacoby, 2003; 673), nevertheless, was damaged 
with the active participation of TAF in politics when it behaved as a political party.
The direct involvement of the military in civilian life on February 28th was criticized 
by Mesut Yılmaz, the prime minister of the day. He claimed that irtica was not the number 
one question for Turkey. Yılmaz implied that intervention was justified only in the case 
of a “clear and present” danger (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 313). The coalition government, 
established in 1999 and led by Bulent Ecevit, worked in harmony with the army; the 
imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of PKK, surely played a role in this regard. 
Thanks to the EU reforms, the influence of civilians was strengthened during the 
2000s. However, the major rupture in civilian-military relations that changed the situation 
in favour of the civilians has been brought on by the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) and Ergenekon 
cases. Only a few now support the idea of an active role for the military in politics, thus the 
armed forces would have hardly any legitimacy were it to decide to intervene in politics. The 
political struggle has been made within the civilian sphere, among the elected government 
and the Gulen movement, which had previously aligned with the AKP to weaken the old 
power structures. The failed coup attempt that took place on July 15thas prompted the 
government to clean the Gulenists from the armed forces and introduce new laws in order to 
maintain absolute control over the military. The new role of the military in this development 
has yet to be seen. But, it is evident that the recent chaos in the Middle East as well as the 
direct threat of terrorism now affecting Turkey are bringing security concerns to the fore.
Not only has the image of the military been damaged after the coup attempt, but its 
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socially isolated structure has been challenged. Immediately after the coup, the government 
relocated and took over the military barracks located in city centers. Military hospitals have 
been transferred to civilians and military high schools, about which we will provide further 
information in the Annex, are closed. The General-in-chief is now directly responsible to the 
president, and the high commanders of the land, navy and air forces to the prime minister. 
All of these developments signal the beginning of a new era, the path of which has not 
been clearly determined yet, although early signs suggestthat civilians intend to establish 
absolute control over the military and put an end to its autonomous structure. This new 
direction can be seen as the end of the trend towards professionalization in civilian-military 
relations in Turkey.
Photo: Flickr user ResoluteSupportMedia. 
CC license.
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ANNEX:  
THE MILITARY’S INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND ITS 
SELF-PERCEPTION
This section of the paper covers the internal structure of the military by focusing on 
recruitment, career structure, payment conditions, discipline and officer ethos. The purpose 
of this enquiry is to cast light on the following issues: the roots of the military’s prestige in 
Turkish culture; the position of minorities in the armed forces (i.e., whether they have been 
able to gain promotion to higher ranks); the daily practices of the military through which 
we can observe its ideological and religious orientations; the formal and informal means 
used by the military to consolidate its discipline; and the financial situation of military 
officers. This section has a more sociological orientation and provides concrete examples 
from the military’s daily practices. The intention is to add some sociological soul to the 
paper, thereby freeing it from a mere formal-institutionalist frame of analysis. 
The Turkish military is the second largest force, after the army of United States, in 
NATO. There are approximately a total of 400,000 personnel in the land forces, 63,000 
in the navy, and 53,000 in the air force (Cizre 2007: 4). The history of the Turkish army 
is said to date back to 209 BC when a systematized army was founded by the Hun leader 
Mete Han. As mentioned, the Turkish military differs from the world’s other militaries 
because it has been motivated by the Kemalist doctrine. This has resulted in the military 
perceiving itself as the representative of the will of the Turkish nation, as elected civilians 
could not take on the responsibility of such a duty because they tended to be corrupt and 
deviated from the secular and nationalist principles of Kemalism. Civilians are, therefore, 
to be kept under tutelage. To reiterate, the armed forces have never attempted to be involved 
in the daily practices of political life. While the military has intervened in politics, it has 
never aimed to establish a military rule. The military has declared itself committed to 
democracy and describes its acts as fine-tuning, implying that it does not aim to change 
the system utterly.
As mentioned, TAF is under the command of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), led by a 
chief of staff. The practice so far has been to appoint a member of the military as the chief, 
although there is no hierarchy among the different departments of the army. The chief 
is not merely a coordinator of the army, but is also entitled to represent each of the navy, 
air forces, and the army (Jenkins 2005: 22). The Gendarmerie is in charge of the security 
of the non-urban areas, which covers the villages, or other small-scale residential areas 
or non-residential areas. It is under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but its 
personnel, training and equipment are provided by TAF (Jenkins 2005: 22).
The TGS is subordinate to the Prime Minister, instead of the Ministry of Defense as 
is normal practice in Western democracies. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for 
conscription and military spending. In protocol the chief of staff outranks the minister 
of defense. TAF has adapted an organizational scheme similar to the American system of 
J-chiefs, involving seven departments, each with its respective responsibility:
• J-1 for personnel;
• J-2 for the arrangement and evaluation of internal and foreign intelligence from both 
the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), police and gendarmerie;
• J-3 for operations planning and training;
• J-4 for logistics;
• J-5 for strategic policies, threat assessment, budgets and military agreements;
• J-6 for communications;
• J-7 for studies of military history and strategy (Jenkins 2005:22).
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The army, the navy, and the air forces have their own military academies, which cadets 
can enter around the age of 19. Military high-schools, which were closed following the 
failed coup attempt of July 15, and academies provide a modern education with the most 
contemporary equipment. The majority of students in the academies come from the five 
military high schools, which provide education for students aged 14 to 19. The academies 
of the army, navy and air force now admit female students. There are several female 
pilots; however, high-profile positions are still filled by men (Jenkins 2005: 23). Selection 
processes to both the academies and the high-schools are competitive, involving physical 
endurance along with required academic achievements. Candidates are screened as if 
they had committed a crime or engaged in political activities. Interrogations include the 
candidate’s family. Special groups of concern in such interrogations are the leftist, Kurdish 
and religiously-oriented students (Jenkins 2005: 23).
The personnel of the TGS are drawn from lower middle-class families; whereas the 
upper-class prefers to engage in other occupations, the lower-classes do not have access to 
essential background education (Jenkins 2005: 23). Jenkins (2005) claims that a military 
caste has not emerged in the Turkish caste system, because officers often discourage their 
children from a career like theirs (Jenkins 2005: 23).
When it comes to the career opportunities of ethnic-groups, we see the following 
practice. Ethnically Kurdish candidates have passed through a detailed interrogation since 
the mid-1980s when the PKK started an insurgency. There are no official or unofficial 
texts that document discrimination against the admittance of ethnically Kurdish, Alewite 
and non- Muslim citizens to the academies or opportunities for promotion. A career in 
the military for Kurdish and Alewite groups is possible provided that they submit to the 
principles of Kemalism like their ethnically Turkish colleagues. The same does not hold 
true for the non-Muslim minorities, namely Christians (Greek and Armenian) and Jewish 
citizens (Jenkins 2005: 24).
The career structure in TAF is strictly meritocratic, thereby favouritism and nepotism 
is not allowed. Officers of TAF are often moved every two-three years from one place to 
another, usually between developed and less developed places. The high degree of relocation 
aims to preclude “cliques loyal to a specific commander or a strong identification with a 
specific unit or region” (Jenkins 2005: 24). 
There are two types of officers: staff and non-staff. The former posting is highly limited 
and competitive. Among the average 450–500 officers who graduate from the army academy 
each year, only 75 will become staff officers. These are then registered in the army staff 
academy, and after graduation gain senior positions with higher salaries (Jenkins 2005: 
25). From these 75 graduates only 24 colonels can rise to the rank of general. 
Promotions are considered each year in August at the annual meeting of the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC), which consists of the prime minister, defense minister, and all 15 
four-star generals and admirals (Jenkins 2005: 25). On paper, the SMC is chaired by the 
prime minister, with the chief of the General Staff acting as secretary. Until very recently, 
the military has had the final say on appointments and promotions. However, since 2011, 
discretion has been transferred to civilians. The main criteria for promotion from colonel 
to general are personal competence and disciplinary record. The competition becomes even 
stricter for promotion from a one-star general to a four-star general; therefore discussions 
on promotion often take more than a day. Until recently, the SMC could filter out pious or 
religiously oriented officers with the charge of involvement in non-disciplinary acts. This 
practice has now changed as religious orientation is no longer defined as a non-disciplinary 
act. The officers who were so charged previously can apply to receive their titles back. 
After the failed coup attempt of 15 July a large number of Gulenists were expelled from 
the military. 
According to the rules, the prime minister, the chief of TAF, and the minister of defense 
jointly submit a list of nominees for service commanders to the president. However, in 
practice, until recently, appointments were decided by the chief of the TGS, based on the 
seniority of the candidates. The chief will have informed the prime minister before the 
meeting about the list. A similar procedure has also been used for the selection of the chief 
of the TGS; on paper, the candidate for chief was selected by the Council of Ministers and 
ratified by the president. The practice, however, has been the selection of the succeeding 
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chief by his predecessor, who has often been the commander of the army (Jenkins 2005: 26).
Until recently the military has been firmly against civilian intervention into their 
organization and operations, including recruitment and promotion practices. One of the 
causes of the 1960 coup was the willingness of the government to influence promotions. 
Generals were strictly forbidden to establish close relationships with politicians (Jenkins 
2005: 27). Politicians attempted to appoint their own candidates to the chief post twice: once 
in 1977 and again in 1987. Whereas the former attempt was unsuccessful, in the latter case 
then president Turgut Ozal managed to have his own nominee, Necip Torumtay, chosen 
as chief. However, Torumtay resigned within three years, as he did not support Ozal’s 
willingness to be involved in the American invasion of Iraq. 
The salaries of military officers are adequate; they are slightly higher than salaries of 
governmental officialsbut not competitive with the private sector. Officers also have access to 
several benefits, including subsidized housing, free medical care, and leisure activities that 
often take place within the premises of the armed forces. Like government officials, military 
officers are entitled to a lump sum when they retire, which is sufficient to purchase a decent 
apartment. Officers and their families enjoy free health benefits during their retirement 
(Jenkins 2005: 27). Generals might have the chance to be employed in the private sector 
when they retire from the military. Otherwise, other members of the personnel including 
the colonels might experience “social isolation” and difficulties in finding alternative jobs 
when they retire in their late 40s or early 50s (Jenkins 2005: 27).
Criminal acts involving the military are handled in the military courts. These crimes 
may include acts committed by individuals who do not fulfil mandatory military service 
requirements, acts committed against military personnel, or infractions that take place 
on the military sites. Discipline in the armed forces is firmly implemented. Even a breach 
of traffic regulations can preclude promotion. Offences of an ideological nature are the 
responsibility of the SMC. Jenkins (2005: 28) notes that, during the period of 1995 and 
August 2000, “a total of 745 serving officers were expelled from the military for ideological 
reasons, almost all of them for suspected Islamist sympathies.” The suspicion towards 
religion, however, does not mean that religion (Islam) is utterly absent in the Turkish 
military. Quite the opposite, regular praying and fasting during the Ramadan is not an 
uncommon practice in the military; all warships of the navy possess a Koran; and military 
corps cry ‘Bismillah’ before firing (Jenkins 2005: 28). The military is called the prophet’s 
heart (Peygamber Ocagi) (Narli 2000). Otherwise, the military has been sensitive to religious 
orientations that have been considered anti-secular or propagandistic (Jenkins 2005: 28).
Under the constitutional guarantee of Article 125, the decisions of the SMC were 
not subject to appeal until recently. Expulsion from the military for religious leanings 
stigmatizes officers, because they have been accused of being engaged in “ill-disciplined” 
activities. (Jenkins 2005: 29). The military and observers of Turkish politics have mentioned 
in particular the Gulen movement’s aim to gain access to the armed forces. As the criteria 
of defining anti-secular activities were somewhat subjective, many officers complained 
about the decisions of the SMC (Jenkins 2005: 29). However, the failed coup attempt in 
2015, which was led by Gulenists, justified the scepticism against the Gulen movement.
The roots of the officer ethos can be found in the military schools and academies, where 
the cadets are trained to protect the principles of Kemalism. Another aspect of military ethos 
is hierarchy, which also has its roots in the military schools. As a practice, cadets should 
show respect even to senior students. One can argue that the prevailing strict discipline 
and hierarchy existing in the armed forces reflect social values and norms (Jenkins 2005: 
30). In the beginning of their education, cadets swear to dedicate their lives to their country 
and to the principles of Kemalism. The weight of Kemalist teaching has been intensified, 
particularly following the 1980 military-coup. Jenkins (2005: 31) explains the reason for 
this as being the polarization of the society in the 1970s along the lines of Marxism and 
ultra-nationalism. Kemalism continued to be the ideological core of the military after the 
1980s through the threats of Kurdish separatism and of political Islam. Political attachment 
to the principles of Kemalism is often accompanied by a mystical perception of Ataturk. 
Each March 13th, military schools commemorate Ataturk’s enrollment as a cadet. In this 
ceremony, cadets shout “Present!” in unison when the name of Ataturk is announced in 
a symbolic rollcall. The sentimental reactions of the cadets (as well as other sections of 
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the society) reach a peak with commemoration of the anniversary of Ataturk’s death on 
November 10th. One might find photographs of clouds or mountains hung on the walls 
in the training academies because of the resemblance of the clouds or the mountains to 
the facial structure of Ataturk (Jenkins 2005: 32). Another aspect of the military ethos is 
to isolate the conflicting views and chaos within the institutional structure of the armed 
forces (Jenkins 2005: 31). One reason for this might be the case to sustain hierarchical 
relationships and the efficiency of the institution. 
The military’s involvement and interest in the economy 
This section examines the sectors in which the military has been active in the economy. 
One dimension of this enquiry is to show the sectors in which the military has invested 
and had direct control. With this remark, I mean to examine the military enterprise known 
as the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK), which was founded in 1961 and has 
since become one of the largest ten and among the most profitable business enterprises in 
Turkey. The armed forces has invested in diverse sectors, including industry, finance, and 
services, amongst others. OYAK is an interesting case, for it enjoys both the legal status of 
any other public enterprise and is thus immune from heavy taxation, and the legal status 
of a private enterprise and is thus free from government control. 
This section is not limited to the OYAK case; the relationship between the military and 
economy is not limited to the non-militaristic economic activities of the military. Military 
spending, which involves public procurement within the defense and security sector, should 
also be examined; control of the defense budget is a contested issue in civilian-military 
relations. 
The military involves and shows interest in the economy in three aspects. First, the 
military is an economic actor with its military holding company, the Armed Forces Trust 
and Pension Fund (OYAK). The second aspect is military spending; what is peculiar in the 
Turkish case is that high and ascending levels of military spending are not under the control 
of the political institutions, but the military. The third aspect is the military industry as 
well as the tendency towards militarization of the Turkish industrial sector (Akça 2010:5).
One of the explanations provided by Akça (2010: 6) for the weak or absent civilian 
control over the military is Turkey’s involvement in capitalist modernization processes at 
a comparatively later stage than Western states. As a consequence, to Akça (2010: 6), the 
military emerges as “an economic actor in all fields of the economy (production, trade, 
finance)” and “[t]his implies, in the Turkish context, the conversion of the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF) into a capitalist collective: The military officer becomes an industrialist, a 
merchant, a financial investor, and a rentier.”
The Turkish case is relatively more developed in this sense when compared to other 
countries that show similar characteristics in the ways in which the military is involved 
in the economy. For example, such an idea emerged in Pakistan in 1953, though it could 
only become effective in the 1970s. Moreover, Pakistan executed a different model than 
comparable cases, with the military officers being given a separate trust fund managed by 
a different holding company. China, too, followed a strategy of establishing military-led 
holding companies in the 1970s. It was common practice in the Central American countries 
(such as Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua), where a military junta was in power after the 
Second World War, to introduce trust funds. However, there too trust funds only become 
effective after the 1990s (Akça 2010: 6). Security has not been thought of solely as a public 
good since the 1980s, as privatization started in this sector. 
T HE A R MED FORCES T RUST A ND PENSION FUND (OYA K)
The military acts as a powerful economic actor through OYAK, which has a peculiar 
organizational form that blurs the distinction between the civilian and military domains 
with regards to “its legal status, its administrative structure, and its activities” (Akça 2010: 
8). OYAK was established on January 3, 1961, after the military coup of 1960, by the 
transitional executive organ (National Unity Committee) that was formed by the military. 
Therefore, the process by which OYAK came into existence was not by way of normal 
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political channels, though it has since been accepted by the political system and society. 
It is ironic that the groups (bureaucracy, intellectuals, and industrialists) that supported 
the military takeover, and the military officers, established and then participated in the 
administration of OYAK. Given that military officers had complained about the economic 
difficulties that they had experienced during the Democrat Party governments of the 
1950s, the military officers justified the trust funds managed by the military as necessary 
to provide an adequate pension to military personnel (Akça 2010).
OYAK has a hybrid identity that combines the characteristics of both a public and a 
private organization. It enjoys “the jurisdiction of either private or public law depending 
on the context” (Akça 2010: 8). Although autonomous in terms of its management and 
finances, OYAK is integrated in the Ministry of Defense. Legal provisions assign OYAK 
a public character by regarding all of its assets and revenues as state property; as such, 
a person or an institution that comes into a situation of being in conflict with OYAK is 
treated as if they were in conflict with the state. In other words, OYAK enjoys the “rights, 
authorities, and privileges” afforded any other public institution (Akça 2010: 8). 
Recently, the management team of OYAK has stressed that the OYAK holding company 
that invests in industrial production and is involved in the financial sector is detached 
from military control; however, the military continues its control with military officers 
dominating the higher management and board positions (Akça 2010: 9). In addition, “[t]
he permanent members of the organization are active officers, non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs), and civil servants in the Turkish Armed Forces. Their membership in the fund is 
compulsory and they constitute the majority of the 250,000 plus members” (Akça 2010: 9). 
Primarily, OYAK is an enforced savings institution; a compulsory membership fee 
is deducted monthly from the wages of the both permanent staff (10 percent) and non-
commissioned officers (5 percent). Needless to say, these contributions constitute major 
resources of the holding, providing a regular and secure income (Akça 2010: 9). OYAK is 
also a complementary social security organization, which supplements the regular national 
pensions fund for its members by offering them social welfare (pension and death and 
disability benefits) and social services (credits and loan financing) (Akça 2010: 9). As a 
result, “OYAK operates as a compulsory savings institution, a supplementary social security 
and welfare organization, and a holding company” (Akça 2010: 9). 
The OYAK holding currently consists of 60 companies that are either joint ventures 
(31) or completely owned by OYAK (29) operating under the holding (Akça 2010: 10). Its 
engagement in economic activities with numerous companies and capital makes OYAK 
one of the five holdings in Turkey along with the private holdings such as Koc, Sabanci 
and Cukurova that has played a considerable role in Turkey’s economy (Akça 2010: 10). It 
has largely concentrated investments in automative manufacture, cement, iron-steel, and 
agricultural products (Akça 2010: 12).
However, in a competitive economy, OYAK enjoys some privileges, which its 
counterparts do not. First and foremost, it has exemptions from several taxes, including 
“income, corporate, inheritance, estate transfer taxes, and revenue stamp duties” (Akça 
2010: 11). However, its partner companies pay those taxes. Furthermore, obligatory salary 
deductions from military personnel creates a consistent cash source for OYAK, which 
has been particularly helpful for the holding in surviving the great economic crises that 
Turkey endured during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, OYAK possessions are 
considered public property, and the relationship between OYAK and its members fall under 
military jurisdiction, which limits the principal (represented) and agency (institutions that 
represent) relationship. All in all, these privileges provide OYAK considerable economic 
advantages (Akça 2010: 11).
Economy policies of the state from the 1960s onwards also contributed to the growth of 
OYAK into one of the largest holdings because of the oligopolistic tendencies of industrial 
production that privileges large portions of production to the hands of a number of large 
holdings. These holdings enjoyed the import-substitute growth strategy between the 1960s 
and 1980s that aimed to protect the domestic market through high tariff barriers. Neoliberal 
policies of the 1980s also helped the large holdings create high profits with state assistance 
through credits, subsidies and exemptions from taxes. As has been mentioned, OYAK had 
already been benefiting from tax exemptions because of its hybrid identity. In this period 
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OYAK also took economic advantage of the massive privatization process and the tendency of 
capital to flow in the direction of finance. While it purchased state-led enterprises either on 
its own or in partnerships, especially during the 1990s, OYAK also lent money to the state. 
As a consequence, it has become a major economic player in the mid-1990s (Akça 2010: 12).
The OYAK experience suggests a peculiar case wherein the military acts not as a minor 
economic actor, but as a major player in the process of Turkey’s industrialization and 
integration to capitalism (Akça 2010: 13). Thanks to the parallel social security system 
created by OYAK—however compulsory this might be—military officers can enjoy the 
living conditions of upper-middle class (Akça 2010: 13). Combined with other subsidies 
offered by the military to its personnel, such as housing and recreational activities, benefits 
provided by OYAK have shielded the military (Akça 2010: 13) from the damaging effects of 
neoliberal policies and economic crises after the 1980s. Surely, OYAK also reinforced the 
privileged position of the military vis-à-vis society, segregating the army from the rest of 
the society (Akça 2010: 13). Akça observes that OYAK has not been subjected to scrutiny 
by the EU. The implication seems to be that OYAK’s partnership with the AXA group and 
Renault as well as the fact that 15 percent of Turkey’s defense industry imports are from 
Germany has spared OYAK from EU (Akça 2010: 14). 
The military has control over military spending in terms of defense budget allocations 
and justifications for spending. There are a number of reasons that preclude the political 
institutions (i.e., the parliament and cabinet) from challenging the power of the military in 
this domain. The central constraint is the asymmetry of power, given that the non-military 
groups lack or have insufficient expertise in the field (Akça 2010: 23). This situation is 
surely not peculiar to the Turkish case; advanced democracies also encounter the same 
problem (Cizre 2007).
Unlike advanced capitalist countries, the historical evolution of Turkey’s military-financial 
and/or military-industrial structure followed a trajectory that began with investments from 
military holdings and expanded after 1980 into a classical model of the military-industrial 
complex. This period was also marked by high rates of military spending combined 
with the fast-paced development of military industry. Yet, similar to the case of military 
spending, TAF enjoyed absolute control over military tenders, procurement, and projects. 
The presence of the military as a capitalist collective also affected the military-industrial 
environment, and consequently a military foundation (TAFF) emerged as the leading actor 
in the sector, alongside other smaller, private companies. (Akça 2010: 24)
What is peculiar to the role that the military has played in the economy is that, unlike 
its western counterparts, the Turkish military has proactively engaged in investment in 
the industrial and financial sector through numerous corporations attached to the OYAK 
holdings. In the meantime, particularly after the 1980s, the Turkish industrial sector and 
Turkish universities have shown interest in the defense sector in order to develop a national 
defense industry that would respond to the modernization demands of the Turkish army 
while working to become a major exporter of defense systems. In fact, an earlier attempt 
in this regard was taken after the US embargo as a result of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus 
in 1974. Yet, major steps towards modernization of the armed forces took place in the 
mid-1980s, followed by significant increases in the budget allocated with this endeavour 
in the mid-1990s (while in 1985 the budget was 12 billion dollars, in 1996, 150 billion 
dollars were allocated to be used over the next 30 years) (Akça 2010: 24). The objectives of 
the modernization projection were to supply the Turkish army the weaponry that was the 
product of the latest technological innovations and to increase the share of the national 
defense industry (Akça 2010: 24). As a result, the rate of self-sufficiency increased to 44.2 
percent in 2008 from 25 percent in 2003 (Akça 2010: 25). However, the military industry 
could only create employment for 17,841 people (Akça 2010: 27). As a consequence of the 
systematic investment in the military industry, exports increased from 138 million dollars 
in 2003 to 576 million dollars in 2008. However, it remains an ambitious aim for Turkey 
to become a major exporter in a market by and large dominated by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, Israel and Germany (Akça 2010: 27).
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ENDNOTES
1 The institutional actors taking part in the security sector include: the armed forces, National Security 
Council, military judiciary, police, gendarmerie, police, coast guard, special operations unit, private security, 
temporary village guards, police intelligence, national intelligence organization, and gendarmerie intelligence. 
2 To quote from Berksoy (2013:8) these changes include the following: “In 2006, the legal amendment specified 
that in times of peace, civilians who commit crimes referred to in the Military Criminal Law will be tried in a civilian 
court. In the 2010 referendum, the military judiciary was limited to crimes committed by military personnel with 
respect to military duties and crimes against the constitutional order are likewise to be tried in civilian courts. The 
structures of the institutions acting as the military’s prop within the judiciary, such as the Supreme Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the Constitutional Court were transformed and the necessary legal amendments were 
made to allow individuals to seek justice for dismissal decisions taken by the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ).” Again 
in 2010, the EMASYA protocols regulating the intervention of military forces in cases of public disorder were 
abolished. In the same year, the task of preparing the National Security Policy Document was transferred mainly 
to the political power.
3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14346325. Retrieved on September 25, 2013.
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This CMI Working Paper presents an analysis of civilian‐military 
relations in Turkey, casting light on institutional, legal and economic 
aspects that have shaped the military’s role in society. An assessment of 
contemporary civilian-military relations in Turkey needs to be informed 
by a historical background. To that end, this paper chronicles how the 
military has evolved since the Ottoman Empire up till today, emphasising 
key historical processes that influence the dynamics between military 
and civilian powers. The paper concludes by observing that in recent 
decades the Turkish military has, by and large, withdrawn from the 
political scene, yet that recent political developments in the region and 
a corresponding intensification of security concerns leave open how this 
may evolve. Civilian-military relations have been considered in the context 
of the failed coup attempt of July 2015 in which the government aimed 
at absolute control over the armed forces and the military lost all of its 
major privileges.
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